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ABSTRACT Physical layer security (PLS) is considered as a promising technique to prevent information
eavesdropping in wireless systems. In this context, cooperative relaying has emerged as a robust solution for
achieving PLS due to multipath diversity and relatively lower transmission power. However, relays or the
relay operators in the practical environment are unwilling for service provisioning unless they are incen-
tivized for their cost of services. Thus, it is required to jointly consider network economics and relay
cooperation to improve system efficiency. In this paper, we consider the problem of joint network economics
and PLS using cooperative relaying and jamming. Based on the double auction theory, we model the
interaction between transmitters seeking for a particular level of secure transmission of information and relay
operators for suitable relay and jammer assignment, in a multiple source-destination networks. In addition,
theoretical analyses are presented to justify that the proposed auction mechanism satisfies the desirable
economic properties of individual rationality, budget balance, and truthfulness. As the participants in the
traditional centralized auction framework may take selfish actions or collude with each other, we propose
a decentralized and trustless auction framework based on blockchain technology. In particular, we exploit
the smart contract feature of blockchain to construct a completely autonomous framework, where all the
participants are financially enforced by smart contract terms. The security properties of the proposed
framework are also discussed.
INDEX TERMS Physical layer security, secrecy capacity, double auction, blockchain, smart contract,
network economics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative relaying is an effective method for increasing
system capacity, coverage area, security, and reliability of
wireless networks [1], [2], [3]. In addition, it is considered as
an attractive solution for improving the energy efficiency [4].
These rewarding merits of cooperative relaying make it one
of the promising techniques for future wireless systems.
For example, it has been investigated as part of the project
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Md Fazlul Kader.
WINNER (WirelessWorld Initiative New Radio) [5], and has
found applications in various networks including cellular, ad
hoc, and wireless sensor networks.
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels, security
and privacy are the major concerns for the future wireless
technology. In this context, recently cooperative relaying has
been considered as a potential technique to achieve the phys-
ical layer security (PLS), which complements the traditional
cryptographic techniques employed at the upper layers of a
wireless network [6], [7]. The feasibility of PLS has been
first discussed by Shannon in [8], later on, its theoretical
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foundations were laid by Wyner in [9], who introduces the
wire-tap channel which can achieve positive secrecy rate
under the assumption that the legitimate destinations expe-
rience a better channel than eavesdroppers. Thus, relay nodes
can be used to exploit the characteristic of wireless channels
such as fading and noise, to transmit a message from a source
to a legitimate destination while trying to keep this message
confidential from eavesdropper. At present, opportunistic
relaying is emerging as a promising paradigm to achieve
the PLS [10], [11]. For example, the effect of single relay
and multi-relay selection strategy on both the security and
reliability of decode-and-forward cooperative systems was
investigated in [10]. Opportunistic relaying protocols in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers were proposed in [11].
In addition to opportunistic relaying, cooperative jamming
has gained significant attention as a means to further enhance
the PLS [12], [13]. For example, in [12] joint relay-and-
jammer selection techniques were proposed to improve the
secrecy capacity of wireless networks. Moreover, a cross
layer PLS design based on random linear network cod-
ing and opportunistic relaying and jamming protocols was
studied in [13].
In all the aforementioned works, it is assumed that relays
are always willing to cooperate with transmitters. But in
reality, the relays may exhibit selfish behaviors and refuse
to cooperate for the concerns on energy and bandwidth con-
sumption. Thus, the relays should be given enough rewards to
compensate for their resource consumption. However, more
often the participants have conflicting interests. For example,
transmitters would prefer to receive services at low cost,
while the relayswould prefer to charge high prices.Moreover,
the transmitters would compete against each other for limited
resources in least pricing to achieve the desired quality of
service. At the same time the relays (or service providers)
would compete among themselves to improve their profit.
In addition, the participants may also lie or impersonate
others to maximize their own benefit. Therefore, it is of
paramount importance to design an unbiased, secure, and
truthful incentive mechanism for reconciling the objectives
of all the participants.
Game theory and mechanism design provide the basic
framework to acquire solutions for resource allocation and
enforcement of cooperation. For example, Stackelberg game
has been exploited in [14] to investigate a distributed algo-
rithm for the interaction between source and friendly jam-
mers. Based on Stackelberg game a distributed relay selection
and power control mechanism was proposed in [15] to
achieve the PLS. Game theory is also employed in [16] for the
selection of shortest distance path relay in a multi-hop coop-
erative communication system. In addition, game theoretic
based resource allocation model for multicell D2D communi-
cation has been proposed in [17]. Moreover, a self-enforcing
truth-telling mechanism was proposed in [18] for multiple
relays selection to achieve PLS, while considering energy
harvesting requirements. If the participants are rational, intel-
ligent and competing, auction-based incentive strategies are
quite beneficial to model in such type of situations [19]–[22].
They are simple to implement but provide effective platform
for the distributed and decentralized competitive market.
In addition, they provide enough structure to enable strong
theoretical claims about the strategies of the participants and
the optimality of solutions. Based on their bidding struc-
tures, the auctions can be classified into: forward, reverse
and double auctions. In the forward auction, many poten-
tial buyers compete with each other by bidding for services
(items) offered by sellers. In the reverse auction, the roles of
buyers and sellers are reversed, such that, the sellers compete
with each other by bidding to serve the buyers. The key
objective of forward auctions is to maximize the revenue of
sellers, and the objective of reverse auctions is to minimize
the cost for buyers. Unlike forward and reverse auctions,
double auction is a two-sided auction, such that, in double
auction bidding is done by both the players (i.e., buyers and
sellers) of the trading market. Auctions have recently become
a topic of much interest in wireless communications literature
[23]–[28]. For example, simultaneous multiple-round ascen-
ding auctionmechanismwere proposed in [23] as a decentral-
ized solution for users’ offloading in a heterogeneous cellular
network. A single round auction was proposed in [24] as
a profitable technique for selecting a mobile relay which
provides the highest possible data rate, while considering
the utilities of all the players including: mobile user, mobile
relay and relay operator. A combinatorial auction mecha-
nism was studied in [25] for solving the spectrum allocation
problem in cognitive radio networks. Specifically, the auction
was employed to approximate the NP hard optimal solution
of social welfare. Optimal relay selection technique was
proposed in [26] through auctioning, in multiple source-
destination networks. In particular, payment mechanism for
both source and relay nodes were designed to avoid selfish
behavior of both the elements. In [27], double auction based
relay assignment techniques were studied for both central-
ized and decentralized wireless networks, while considering
interference due to relay transmissions. Moreover, double
auction was also studied in [28] for spectrum trading between
femtocell service providers and macrocell service providers,
such that maximum trading fairness can be achieved.
However, these schemes are based on risk-free and trust-
ful trading environment. In addition, they rely on a central
authority (auctioneer). It is well documented that auctions
contain many security risks which can lead to possible system
collapses [29]–[31]. For example, buyers and sellers may col-
lude and repudiate bids. As another possibility, the auctioneer
may cheat and award the auction to someone other than the
legitimate winner. Moreover, the auctioneer may disclose
bidders’ identities to any other trading participant or to a
third party agent. Several efforts have been made to address
some of these issues [32]–[36]. For example, an agent-based
trust management framework was proposed in [32] that can
re-evaluates users’ trust values and updates access permis-
sions dynamically. In addition to the agent-based approach,
cryptographic technology was proposed in [33] to automate
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and secure the auction process. Furthermore, trustworthy
supervisor-based protocol was presented in [34] to address
the malicious activities of the rational auctioneer. These
schemes rely on a trusted third party (i.e., agents, supervisor,
etc) that facilitates the development of trustful environment.
Hence, it is important to have a mechanism that ensures
trusted third party does not intend to collude, and also facili-
tates trading through explicit digital currency.
Blockchain is a revolutionary technology that has recently
attracted the attention of not only research community but
also the interest of a wide range of stakeholders of industries
related to healthcare [37], finance, real estate [38] and gov-
ernment sectors [39]. This is because it offers the realization
of distributed, trust-free, transparent and highly secure sys-
tems [40]–[42]. In particular, smart contract based blockchain
solutions offer decentralized and distributed applications
where everyone is allowed to build their own arbitrary rules
for agreements, transaction formats, and state transition func-
tions [43], [44]. The smart contracts enable the blockchain
system to only validate the transactions that take place under
the condition of the agreed upon contract. Because of this,
the blockchain has a great potential to resolve some of the
issues related to lack of trust or incomplete information about
the counter trading party, which conventionally required a
central trusted party [45]–[48]. Note that, to the best of our
knowledge, the existing work on network economics using
game theory and mechanism design only consider relay(s)
assignment in a single source-destination network. Thus,
the keymotivations of this paper are twofold: (i) To bridge the
gap between existing work and the allocation problem, and
propose an incentive mechanism to achieve the PLS in relay-
assisted multiple source-destination networks. (ii) To exploit
the blockchain features for the distributed and trust-free envi-
ronment in order to address the aforementioned malicious
activities in the trading process. The main contributions of
the paper are summarized as follows:
1) We employ double auction theory to model the two
sided interaction between transmitters and relay opera-
tors, where transmitters demand for a particular level
of security while relay operators sell their services
including bandwidth, and optimal relay and jamming
power. In addition, we prove that the proposed model
is economic robust in terms of individual rationality,
budget balance, and truthfulness.
2) We exploit the features of blockchain technology to
strengthen the weaknesses of the auction model, and
propose a decentralized, trustless, and autonomous auc-
tion framework, where the role of a central mediator
is distributed among all the trading parties (i.e., buyers
and sellers). Moreover, we introduce a virtual currency
system in the proposed framework for trading, and for
encouraging even the non-trading agents to participate
in facilitating the auction process.
3) Simulation results are presented to demonstrate the
impact of malicious agent in the centralized auction
environment, and how the malicious activities can be
avoided by the proposed framework of blockhchain and
auctioning. The detailed discussions on the security
properties of the proposed framework is also provided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model and problem formulation, and
introduces relevant notations. A detailed description of the
proposed auction mechanism is provided in Section III, and
its properties are analyzed. Section IV presents the proposed
distributive auction framework. Results and discussions are
provided in Section V followed by conclusions in Section VI.
FIGURE 1. A network consisting of n transmitter-destination nodes,
where each transmitter ti wants to send a confidential message to
destination di through cooperative relaying in the presence of an
eavesdropper ei . A set of relays are managed by a relay operator qi . Each
relay operator is responsible for suitable relay/jammer selection and
resource (i.e., power and frequency sub-carrier/bandwidth) allocation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a network as shown in Fig. 1, where a transmitter
ti wants to share a confidential message to destination di in the
presence of a passive eavesdropper ei. We assume that there
is no direct link between ti and the destination di, i.e., di can
only receive signals through intermediate nodes. There are
multiple intermediate nodes, such that, each node can either
help in relaying the transmitter information to the legitimate
destination or can cause interference to overhearing attack
by the eavesdropper. We assume that the network topology
contains m relay operators Q = {q1, q2, . . . qm}, each relay
operator qi is associated to a group of nodes. In particu-
lar, the relay operator is responsible for selecting suitable
nodes for communication services and managing available
resources including subcarriers allocation and power allo-
cation. Note that, we assume that both the operator and its
corresponding relays are the members of same entity.
Each transmitter ti desires to achieve a certain level of
secure transmission of information to its destination di at the
minimum cost of service. We assume that the relay operators
are already serving regular transmitters in the network. Thus,
a relay operator can only serve an additional transmitter ti for
secure communication if it contains a free subcarrier fi > 0
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to allocate. The relay operators can be paid for providing this
additional services as a compensation for resource alloca-
tion and communication cost. This implies that the trading
between a transmitter and the relay operator should meet cer-
tain requirements to benefit both parties. For example, relay
operators need to be encouraged to allocate their resources,
and the requirements of the transmitters should be satisfied.
In particular, a relay operator cannot be paid less than the cost
of its service, while the allocated resources must satisfy the
transmitter’s service request within the limited budget. Note
that, each relay operator has complete knowledge of channel
state information (CSI) of all the nodes of its group as well
as the CSI of legitimate destinations and their corresponding
eavesdroppers. In order to achieve secure communication
at di, each relay operator selects the best possible pair of
nodes {n∗i , j∗i }, such that, a relay n∗i forwards the confidential
message of ti. At the same time, the selected jammer j∗i
generates artificial interference in order to deteriorate the
eavesdropper’s channel. Furthermore, we assume that all di’s
are served over orthogonal subcarriers. Note that, there are
variousmethods available in the physical layer security litera-
ture for the selection of an appropriate relay-jammer pair [12].
Hence, the discussion on the selection procedure is avoided
in this paper.
All the links connecting the nodes are assumed to be inde-
pendent but not identically distributed (i.n.i.d) quasi-static
Raleigh fading channels. The channel gain between node i
and j is represented as |hi,j|2. Thus, the channel capacity of
link connecting n∗i and destination di can be defined as:
Cdi = Wi log2(1+
ρi|hn∗i ,di |2
ρ¯i|hj∗i ,di |2 + N0
), (1)
whereWi is the channel bandwidth,N0 represents the additive
noise power, and ρi and ρ¯i are the transmission powers of
relay n∗i and jammer j∗i , respectively. Similarly, the channel
capacity of the link connecting n∗i and eavesdropper ei is
equal to
Cei = Wi log2(1+
ρi|hn∗i ,ei |2
ρ¯i|hj∗i ,ei |2 + N0
), (2)
For secure communication such that an eavesdropper ei can
obtain zero mutual information from the confidential mes-
sage of transmitter ti, the relay n∗i should forwards the mes-
sage with the secrecy capacity given as:
Csei = (Cdi − Cei )+ (3)
where (.)+ = max(., 0). It is assumed that all the links in
the first-hop {ti → ni} are of better quality than the links
in the second-hop {ni → di}. In addition, given that no
direct links exist between ti and ei, security is always guar-
anteed in the first hop links. Thus, in the following sections,
we only focus on the secrecy capacity of the second-hop links.
It can be observed from (1) and (2) that both Cdi and Cei
are the increasing functions of relay power ρi. On the other
hand, the channel capacities can be reduced by increasing
the jamming power ρ¯i. We assume that each transmitter ti
demands for a specific minimum secrecy capacity Ci. Thus,
in order to achieve the required level of security, each relay
operator needs to carefully allocate powers ρi and ρ¯i. Note
that, the cost of communication service increases with the
increase of total power allocation. We assume that each relay
operator intends to provide the most cost-effective solution
for a satisfactory service. For convenience, the key parame-
ters of the system model have been sumarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Key parameters of the system model.
Mainly, based on the number of free subcarriers, each
relay operator can serve multiple transmitters ti at the same
time. Thus, the larger the number of transmitters served by a
relay operator, the higher will be its utility. To maximize the
benefits to both transmitters and relay operators, an incentive
mechanism should be properly designed to match the relay
operators’ services and the transmitters’ demands. However,
given that we consider a highly distributed network with
various parties, it is reasonable to assume that each party
intends to maximize its own benefit. There are a number
of malicious activities that could deter the harmony of the
system. For example, a transmitter may cheat and pay less
to the selected relay operator or the relay operator may not
be paid with the right amount, or the relay operator may not
fulfill the work as it agreed to do, etc. In order to tackle these
issues related to transparency and integrity, we exploit the
features of blockchain technology, which will be discussed
in Section IV.
III. AUCTION MODEL AND PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
This section presents a general framework proposed for suit-
able matching between the transmitters demands of PLS and
the relay operators. In particular, in addition to achieving
PLS the proposed framework aims to select appropriate relay-
jammer pairs for the minimum cost of service. Considering
a single-round double auction mechanism for the two sided
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interaction between the transmitters and the relay operators,
where all the transmitters that are desirous to achieve certain
level of security i.e., Csei ≥ Ci, act as buyers. On the other
hand, all the relay operators managing intermediate nodes
for cooperation act as sellers. A control unit near to the par-
ticipants can serve as an auctioneer. Note that, the selection
process of auctioneer according to the proposed distributed
framework will be discussed in Section IV. The auction is
usually based on two stages:
1) allocation stage (also called winners determination
problem): determining the best possible pairs of sellers
and buyers
2) pricing stage: determining the payment to be made by
each (winning) buyer and the payment to be made to
each (winning) seller.
The detailed description of the auction framework is
described as follows:
A. AUCTION FRAMEWORK
Before the auction process starts, it is assumed that all the
parties are well informed about the buyers demands of secu-
rity requirements (i.e., Ci). We consider that each buyer has
different valuations of the sellers. This is because of dif-
ferent quality of communication (e.g., channel conditions)
between the buyers ti and the sellers qj. Similarly, given that
each buyer ti has distinct security requirements, and because
of different channel conditions between cooperative relays
and receivers Ri ∈ {di, ei}, each seller has its own cost of
delivery for destination di. We refer seller’s bids as asks to
differentiate them from that of a buyer. Thus, each buyer has
different bids for sellers, and each seller has different asks
for buyers. By considering a sealed bid auction, both buyers
and sellers submit their respective offers to the auctioneer in
a private manner. Once all the traders have submitted their
offers, the auctioneer identifies suitable pairs of buyers and
sellers according to the proposed double auction mechanism
(Algorithm 1). The final result of the auction consists of:
winning buyers set Bb ⊆ U = {t1, t2, . . . tn}, winning seller
set Ss ⊆ Q = {q1, q2, . . . qm}, payment vector Pb containing
payments pbi,j that winning buyers ti are charged by sellers qj,
and price vector Ps containing prices psi,j that winning sellers
qj are rewarded by ti.
The utility of a buyer ti can be defined as its true val-
uation minus the price it pays to the winning seller qj,
given as:
Ubti = σi,jCi − pbi,j
where, σi,j represents the gain for a unit of secrecy capacity
such that σi,j = αti,qjd
−ati,qj
ti,qj with αti,qj being a positive
constant, and dti,qj and ati,qj are the Euclidean distance and
the path loss exponent between node ti and qj, respectively.
Note that, the communication cost (i.e., energy spent by
ti per secrecy bit) between ti and qj is proportional to the
term d
−ati,qj
ti,qj . This implies that, larger the value of d
−ati,qj
ti,qj
higher will be the communication cost, which also reduces
the utility of buyer ti. The utility of seller qj can be defined
as the total payments it receives from the winning buyers
minus the total cost of its services. Mathematically, it can be
expressed as:
U sqj =
n∑
i=1
[psi,j − c(ρi, ρ¯i)]Ii,j
where, Ii,j ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function such that Ii,j = 1 if
seller qj is paired with buyer ti, otherwise Ii,j = 0. In addition,
c(ρi, ρ¯i) is the cost of delivering secure communication, and
it can be defined as:
c(ρi, ρ¯i) = ηi,j(ρi + ρ¯i)+ εi,j (4)
where, ηi,j is the unit cost of relay and jamming power, and
εi,j represents the commission which the auctioneer charges
the seller for facilitating the auction. We assume that the auc-
tioneer commission is a percentage cost of relay and jamming
power allocation, which is only charged to the winning seller.
Thus for winning seller we can define εi,j = κ×ηi,j(ρi+ ρ¯i),
where 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 is the percentage value.
Given that, each relay operator is intended to offer mini-
mum cost of service as discuss in Section II. Therefore, before
submitting an offer for buyer ti each seller employs (5) to
minimize its cost.
B. RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODEL
For fixed values of ηi,j and κ , the minimum cost of communi-
cation can be achieved by solving the following optimization
problem:
min
ρi, ρ¯i
c(ρi, ρ¯i) (5)
subject to: Csei ≥ Ci, (6)
ρi ≤ ρmax, (7)
ρ¯i ≤ ρmax, (8)
where, ρmax represents the maximum transmission power of
an intermediate node. Given that the constraint (6) is not
convex, the optimization problem is clearly non convex.
Lemma 1: The cost minimization problem (5) can be
transformed into Geometric Programming (GP) optimization
problem.
Proof: For notational convenience, let us first define
γi,j = ρiN0 |hi,j|2 as the instantaneous SNR of the link between
node i and j, where ρi represents the transmission power.
In addition, by comparing (1) and (2) with Shannon’s capac-
ity formula, we obtain φdi = γn∗i di/(γj∗i di + 1), φei =
γn∗i ei/(γj∗i ei + 1). Thus, (6) can be re-formulated as:
φdi ≥ τdi ,
φei ≤ τei ,
τdi − τei ≥ τi,
where τi = 2Ci − 1. Consequently, after substitutions and
mathematical manipulations the optimization problem can be
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expressed as:
min
τD,τE
c(ρi, ρ¯i) (9)
subject to: τdiγj∗i diγ
−1
n∗i di
+ τdiγ−1n∗i di ≤ 1, (10)
γn∗i eiτ
−1
ei
γj∗i ei + 1
≤ 1, (11)
τeiτ
−1
di
+ τiτ−1di + τiτ−1di τei ≤ 1, (12)
ρiρ
−1
max ≤ 1, (13)
ρ¯iρ
−1
max ≤ 1, (14)
where the constraints (10), (12), (13) and (14) are in the
posynomial form. However, (11) is not posynomial since the
ratio of monomial by posynomial is non-posynomial [49].
To deal with this issue, we approximate the denominator
of (11) with monomial function by employing widely known
arithmetic geometric mean approximation [50], as follows:
1
γj∗i ei + 1
= (γj
∗
i ei
(t)
α(t)
)−α(t)( 1
β(t)
)−β(t), (15)
where α(t) = γj∗i ei (t−1)
γj∗i ei (t−1)+1
and β(t) = 1
γj∗i ei (t−1)+1
. Thus,
using (15) we can approximate (11) into a posynomial form
related to each iteration, as follows:
γn∗i eiτ
−1
ei (
γj∗i ei (t)
α(t)
)−α(t)( 1
β(t)
)−β(t) ≤ 1. (16)
This completes the proof
Once the optimization problem is transformed into a
GP problem, the solution can be obtained using the CVX
toolbox [49].
C. DESIRABLE PROPERTIES OF DOUBLE AUCTION
In order to encourage participation of all buyers and sellers,
the auction mechanism should satisfy some of the desired
economic requirements, as follow:
1) INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
According to this property, the payment made by a buyer
should be less than or equal to its bid, and the price received
by a seller should be greater than or equal to its ask price.
In other words, this property ensures that no one should lose
by joining the auction.
2) BUDGET BALANCE
According to this property, the payments of the buyers must
be entirely transferred to the sellers, i.e., the total payment
charged to winning buyers should be equal to total price
rewarded to winning sellers. In other words, the auctioneer
does not lose or gain (except fixed percentage commission)
money during the trade.
3) TRUTHFULNESS
Truthfulness is the most fundamental property of auctions.
All the buyers and sellers are usually rational and selfish,
they canmanipulate their bids and asks tomaximize their own
utility. Therefore, this property ensures that neither the seller
nor the buyer can improve its utility by misreporting its true
valuations.
Algorithm 1 Double Auction
1: All the sellers employ (5) to calculate asks
2: All the buyers calculate bids corresponding to each seller
3: The auctioneer employes the following procedure:
4: Input: All bids B, All asks A, Sellers resourcesR
5: Output: sellers set Ss, buyers set Bb, sellers price vector
Ps, and buyers payment vector Pb
6: Shortlist asks which are greater than or equal to their
corresponding bids, that is, Ac = {ati,qj |ati,qj ≥ bti,qj}
7: Shortlist bids, such that, Bc = {bti,qj |ati,qj ≥ bti,qj}
8: Sort all the elements of Ac in ascending order
9: Arrange the elements of Bc according to elements in Ac
10: Initialize: Bb = ∅, Ss = ∅, Pb = ∅, Ps = ∅, i = 1
11: while Ac 6= ∅ do
12: if fi > 0 then
13: Bb← Bb ∪ {ti},Ss← Ss ∪ {qi}
14: pbi,j = min(bti,qi , ati,qi+1 ), psi,j = pbi,j
15: Pb← Pb ∪ {pbi,j}, Ps← Ps ∪ {psi,j}
16: fi = fi − 1
17: Update Ac by removing asks corresponding to buyer ti
18: Update Bc by removing all the remaining bids of ti
19: else
20: if fi ≤ 0 then
21: Ac← Ac \ {ati,qi}
22: Bc← Bc \ {bti,qi}
23: end if
24: end if
25: i = i+ 1
26: end while
27: Return: Bb, Ss, Pb, Ps
D. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
This section describes the proposed double auction mecha-
nism in detail in Algorithm 1. We start by representing a bid
bti,qj as the maximum price that a buyer ti is willing to pay
for a seller qj, and denote ati,qj as the price that qj asks for its
service to ti. In addition, we consider that each seller qj has fj
subcarriers to allocate as discussed in Section II. Thus, a pair
{ti, qj} can be defined as feasible for matching iff bti,qj ≥ ati,qj
and fj > 0. We assume that all the non-zero asks are collected
in a setA = {at1,q1 , . . . , atm,qn}. Similarly, the respected bids
are also collected in a set B = {bt1,q1 , . . . , btm,qn}. In the
allocation stage, all the feasible elements ofA are first added
into the candidate set, i.e.,Ac← AwithAc = {ati,qj |bti,qj ≥
ati,qj}. Likewise, Bc ← B with Bc = {bti,qj |bti,qj ≥ ati,qj}.
Afterward, elements of Ac are sorted in ascending order of
their values such that ati,qj ≥ ati,qj+1 . For point-to-point
(bid-ask) association, the elements of Bc are also arranged in
accordance withAc. At this stage, the order of elements inAc
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also determines the priority of sellers, such that, highest prior-
ity will be given to seller who has theminimum ask. However,
if two or more elements inAc are equal, then priority will be
given to seller who is offered by the highest bid.
Thus, in order to determine winning buyer-seller pairs
(from Line 10 to 26 in Algorithm 1), we start from the first
(highest priority) element inAc and check for the availability
of free subcarrier (Line 12). A pair {ti, qj} will be considered
as valid if fj > 0. The winning buyer and seller are then
added into winning sets, such that: Bb← Bb∪{ti} and Ss←
Ss∪{qj} (Line 13). Note that, a buyermay be feasible formore
than one seller, therefore, all the remaining elements (asks)
in Ac that are linked to ti are deleted (Line 17). Similarly,
elements of Bc that are related to ti are also deleted (Line 18).
In the pricing stage, in order to satisfy the desirable property
of individual rationality, the payment pbi,j which the buyer
ti ∈ Bb needs to pay is the best unsuccessful offer min(ati,−qj )
as long as it is lower than the successful bid bti,qj . Otherwise,
the winning buyer will be charged equal to its bid. Mathemat-
ically, it can be expressed as: pbi,j = min(bti,qj ,min(ati,−qj )),
where ati,−qj represents the asks of sellers except qj.
Lemma 2: The proposed auctionmechanism satisfies indi-
vidual rationality.
Proof: According to the proposed auction, the payment
psi,j such that qj ∈ Ss is always greater than or equal to ati,qj ,
i.e., psi,j ≥ ati,qj . On the other hand, the payment pbi,j with
ti ∈ Bb is always less than or equal to bti,qj , i.e., pbi,j ≤ bti,qj .
Thus, both the winning sellers and buyers do not lose from
joining the auction, which completes the proof.
Lemma 3: The proposed auction mechanism is budget
balanced.
Proof: After the winning determination stage, each
winning buyer ti ∈ Bb has only one winning seller qj ∈ Ss.
This implies that |Bb| = |Ss|. Moreover, for each winning
pair {ti, qj}, the payment pbi,j made by ti is equal to the price
pbi,j received by qj. Thus, it is clear to express that:
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pbi,j =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
psi,j. (17)
This completes the proof.
Lemma 4: The proposed auction mechanism is truthful for
both the sellers and the buyers.
Proof: In the proposed method, a winning seller qj is
always rewarded with payment less than or equal to ask of
seller who loses the trade, also termed as critical ask for qj.
However, the seller will be removed form the list of winning
set if it changes its offer to a value greater than the second
minimum ask i.e., ati,qj > min(ati,−qj ). Therefore, likewise
the VCGmechanism [19], being truthful will be the dominant
strategy for the sellers. On the other hand, given that a buyer
ti can only win if bti,qj ≥ ati,qj , therefore, ati,qj can be referred
as the critical bid for buyer ti, if it loses by submitting bti,qj <
ati,qj , given others submission remain unchanged. In addition,
the winner will be charged aqj+1 if bti,qj ≥ ati,qj+1 , otherwise
it will be charged equal to its bid. However, for a particular
seller qj, the highest priority will be given to the buyer who
offers the highest bid. This produces a tradeoff for the buyer ti,
that is, either it can win and increase its profit by bidding just
above the critical bid (if it exceptionally knows the value) but
lower than its true value, or it can lose the trade and achieves
zero benefit. Thus, given that a buyer is always charged less
than or equal to its bid, truthful bidding will be the dominant
strategy for him/her. This completes the proof.
E. THE NEED FOR BLOCKCHAIN
There aremany fundamental risks of adopting the plain sealed
bid auction. For example, in the proposed scheme, only a
single element (auctioneer) is responsible for all the decisions
and the transactions. In particular, the auctioneer receives all
the sealed bids from both the trading parties, and declares
clearing prices which the buyers have to pay for their desirous
PLS. The auctioneer is regarded as part of the auction mech-
anism, and it is assumed that he abides by the protocol. Given
that only the auctioneer sees the bids and reveals the auction
outcome, there could be a possibility that it maymisbehave by
inserting fictitious bids or by removing bids or by declaring
false results to maximize his personal benefit. Thus because
of its personal benefits the auctioneer may ruin the network
performance for other transmitters. For example, as will be
shown in Section VI-A, that the network will suffer by loss
of data and high power consumptions if there is a corrupted
auctioneer who only ignores the lowest ask prices. On the
other hand, both sellers and buyers can also cheat by sub-
mitting multiple bids using multiple fake identities. This way
the sellers can achieve maximum profit out of their services,
and the buyers can acquire their desired service at the lowest
possible price. Moreover, a seller or a buyer can also deviate
from the standard trade process. For example, after receiving
payment the seller doesn’t provide the requested security
service as he agreed to do, or after acquiring the service the
buyer doesn’t respond or transfer the money. This leads to
reduced trust between all the parties including bidders and
auctioneer, potentially decreasing the number of participants
as well as the level of bidding competition.
Thus, in order to deter all the parties from cheating and
to develop a trustful environment, and also to fully harness
the benefits of the proposed auction mechanism, it is vital
that there exists a decentralized way for all the decisions to
be made. In addition, it is important that the participants’
identities as well as their corresponding transactions are
to be verified distributively. For this purpose, we exploit
the blockchain technology for the development of a dis-
tributed auction framework. The key use of the blockchain-
based framework has two folds: 1) employing the smart
contract facility to validate the transactions and 2) settle
the payments to buyers and sellers. The detailed description
of the proposed framework is presented in the following
sections.
VOLUME 7, 2019 95561
A. S. Khan et al.: Blockchain-Based Distributive Auction for Relay-Assisted Secure Communications
IV. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DISTRIBUTIVE
AUCTION FRAMEWORK
The proposed system contains several distrusting parties
i.e., transmitters, sellers, relay-jammer pairs who intend to
work together for a common goal. In this section, we intro-
duce a public blockchain framework that interconnects all
the distrusting parties without a central authority. To build a
blockchain framework, on top of the partiesmentioned above,
we also introduce miners who verify the transactions and
update the blockchian to build a trustless system by enabling
transparency, integrity and validity. Note that, miners are
usually separate entities who are equipped with enough
computational power to perform transaction verification and
validation.
Given that, one of the key objectives of this work is
the development of fully distributed, cheat-free and trustless
framework, therefore, we adopt Ethereum based permission-
less blockchain instead of permissioned blockchain. This
is because permissioned blockchain relies on trusted nodes
which consequently establishes a partially centralized trust
in the network [51]. In this case the performance of the
network can be easily degraded if the trusted nodes collude by
themselves or being attacked by external elements.Moreover,
Instead of Bitcoin, the reason behind the choice of Ethereum
to support the decentralized network and handling financial
transactions is to minimize the mining process. For exam-
ple, bitcoin framework has a mining window of 10 minutes,
which is longer for the underlying relay wireless channel.
On the other hand, Ethereum framework can support a mining
window of up to 12 seconds [52], which is more suitable
for the considered framework. It is important to note that,
increasing the mining window from 12 seconds to 10 minutes
will also increase the risk of double spending by a factor of
at least fifty. Given that, our model is based on Ethereum
blockchain, therefore, Ether will be considered as virtual
currency for all types of payments. It enables all the parties
in the system to make and receive payments. Moreover, Ether
can also be exchanged with other popular coins [53]. Let us
briefly introduce the important building blocks required for
the proposed blockchain.
A. BUILDING BLOCKS OF BLOCKCHAIN
1) ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY
Each new party, when they join the relay-auction system,
generates new pair of public and private keys using popular
asymmetric crypto systems such as ECC (Elliptic-curve cryp-
tography) [54]. The private key is used to protect the virtual
wallet of the party. The public keys are public and anyone can
obtain other’s public keys and it can be used for identification
purposes. Asymmetric cryptography can be used to encrypt
messages using public key and the encrypted messages can
be decrypted by the private key. The same keys can be
used to sign a message which is explained in the following
section.
2) DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME
The digital signatures can be used to prove the prove-
nance or the owner of the messages communicated between
two parties. This can be achieved by the same public-private
key pairs generated using the asymmetric cryptography. For
example, if Alice wants to generate a signature for a message,
then she can encrypt the message using the private key. The
encrypted message can be decrypted by the corresponding
public key which is known to Bob. If Bob can decrypt the
message sent by Alice using Alice’s public key then Bob can
ensure that the message was indeed sent by the Alice.
The digital signature scheme is vital for all blockchain
systems. Every time the buyers and sellers exchange mes-
sages (bids or ask price), miners will use the digital signature
scheme to verify the identity of the sender.
3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTION
Cryptographic hash functions can be used to generate a mes-
sage digest with a fixed length regardless of the size of the
message. There are several algorithms such as SHA-256 can
be exploited for this purpose. The advantage of the hash
function is that it will produce unique message digest for
the message as long as the message is not altered. Even if
the message is altered by one bit, the output of the hash
function will be completely different. Hash functions are easy
to compute and it is infeasible to find two different messages
that produce the same message digest.
4) SMART CONTRACT
Smart contract is a software program that executes an agree-
ment between distrusting parties automatically in the digital
domain [55]–[57]. Smart contract can be used to transfer
valuables between distrusting parties without the need for a
middleman. The important property of a smart contract is that
if one party agrees to pay a certain amount of money for a
given service then the party can neither deny payment after
receiving the service nor tamper the smart contract [58].
5) MINERS AND MINING BLOCKS
In the public blockchain, since there is no central author-
ity, the role of miners is important. The miners ensure that
no one in the system can cheat by verifying the transac-
tions, executing the smart contracts to make the payments
and record all the activities in a public ledger (blockchain).
To ensure that miners are not cheating the systems, the public
blockchain has several protocols [59] such as proof-of-work,
proof-of-stake, proof-of-burn, etc. These protocols ensure that
a miner which is approving a transaction has negative benefit
if it is trying to cheat the other parties in the distributed
network. In Bitcoin blockchain, the time required for the
proof-of-work is set to 10 minutes, while in Ethereum it is
set to 12 seconds, as mentioned before. Note that, Proof-of-
Work algorithm in Ethereum is also known as Ethash which
is a modified version of a precursor algorithm known as
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FIGURE 2. Block diagram of the proposed framework.
Dagger-Hashimoto [60]. However, because of scalability,
speed and energy consumption issues of Ethash, recently,
proof-of-stake also known as Casper in Ethereum is emerging
as a potential approach for the next generation of Ethereum
blockchain.
6) SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
Initially, each party generates their own public and private key
pair. Denote the number of buyers, sellers and miners active
on a particular session as nB, nS , and nM , respectively. Denote
the public and private key pairs for party i as {pki, ski}. Each
party has a number of Ethers in the digital wallet. Denote the
cth Ether coin belongs to ith party wallet as ETHc,i which is
a 256−bit long serial number. This coin is registered against
party ith public key pki and if a party wants to send this coin to
another party then it will use the private key for validation. For
example, let us consider two parties, Alice and Bob, whose
public-private key pairs are {pkA, skA} and {pkB, skB}. Now,
let us suppose, Alice wants to pay 1 Ether (serial number
ETHc,pkA ) to Bob. To do that, Alice prepare the following
transaction:
TAlice−>Bob = EncskA (ETHc,pkA ||pkB)||ETHc,pkA ||pkB,
where EncskA (.) denotes asymmetric key encryption algo-
rithm and || denotes concatenation operation. Transaction
TAlice−>Bob contains the serial number of Ether, Bob’s public
key, and digital signature of transaction to prove that this
is indeed generated by Alice. This transaction may contain
other parameters such as date and serial number. Most impor-
tantly, Alice obtains the digital signature of this transaction
by encrypting the transaction using skA. Now the transaction
and the corresponding signature is sent to the network. This
transaction can be verified by the miners by checking the
following:
DecpkA (ETHc,pkA ||pkB) = ETHc,pkA ||pkB,
where DecpkA () denotes the asymmetric key decryption algo-
rithm. The miner first checks whether the message is actually
sent by Alice using the pkA. If the above verification is
successful then the miners will search the past transactions
from the blockchain and check who actually owns the coin
ETHc,pkA . If the last owner of the coin is indeed Alice then
the miners can approve the transaction by creating a new
block where the ownership of the coin is transferred to Bob.
Based on this fundamental principle, the following subsec-
tions define the steps of the blockchain architecture.
7) AUTHENTICATION
Since our model is built on top of the Etherium framework,
the authentication of transactions will use the default settings,
e.g., it relies on public-private key pairs, the properties of
public key encryption, and digital signature as described in
Section IV-A.2. As described in Section IV-A.6, each party
has a pseudo identity known by its public key (pki). This
public key is linked to their wallet, such that, anyone can
verify the balance in the wallet. Since it is a distributed
system, there is no restriction for a new party to join the
system. When a new party joins the system, as described
in Section IV-A.6, the party will generate its own public
and private key. The public key will be announced to the
system.
V. RELAY SMART CONTRACT
This section describes the Ethereum-based smart contract for
the proposed work. As shown in the ‘‘contract Relay’’ pseudo
code in Fig. 3, the smart contract has a number of public
and private functions. These functions can be invoked by
sellers, buyers and the smart contract itself. Let us explain
responsibilities of sellers, and buyers as well as the smart
contract logic below.We also split the whole process into four
time periods, as shown in Fig. 2.
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FIGURE 3. Pseudocode code of the proposed Relay smart contract.
A. BUYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
Initially, the buyer performs its own calculation using the
channel gain information of the seller and calculates the
required secrecy capacity and the amount it is willing to pay
for the service. Once this calculation is performed, the buyer
invokes function buyerPlaceBid() to create a new bidding
process. The input parameters for this functions are unique
transaction identification number (txid ), the requirements,
time stamp and digital signature of the transaction. Let us
denote this as TBuyer−>Blockchain Network where
TBuyer−>Blockchain Network = data1||data2||data3,
where
data1 = Secrecy capacity||txid ||pkBuyer ||Time,
data2 = H (bids||nonce||capacity||txid ||pkBuyer ||Time),
data3 = EncskBuyer (data2||data1),
where H (.) denotes hashing operation using SHA256 algo-
rithm. Note that the bid value is hidden inside the hash value
in data2. Digital signature of the transaction is in data3.
To randomise the hash operation, the buyer is adding a ran-
dom nonce during the hash computation. Since the range
of bids is small, this nonce will secure the bid from miners
during Time Slot 1. During Time Slot 3, bid and nonce
will be revealed by the buyer. The buyer will also make a
default payment to the smart contract by invoking function
buyerMakeDefault(). The default payment must be fixed
and much higher than the bid. Given that the bid value is
protected by its hash, therefore, the default payment can be
public.
B. SELLER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
At the end of Time Slot 1, the smart contract broadcasts
the bidding through ‘‘event’’ function. This is to notify
all the sellers about the new bidding. Once sellers receive
TBuyer−>Blockchain Network in Time Slot 1, they extract capacity
requirements and based on the channel gains, sellers calculate
the ask prices for different buyers, and then invoke function
sellerPlaceBid() using the following arguments as input in
Time Slot 2:
TSeller−>Blockchain Network = data4||data5||data6,
where,
data4 = txid ||pkSeller ||pkBuyer ||Time,
data5 = H (ask price||nonce||txid ||pkSeller ||pkBuyer ||Time),
data6 = EncskBuyer (data4||data5).
The transaction TSeller−>Blockchain Network contains the same
txid and public key of the seller and buyer. This transaction
signed by the sellers private key (data6). Instead of transmit-
ting this message to the network, the seller obtains a hash
value (data5) of the transaction which is again randomised
by nonce. It should be noted that there is a predefined period
for the first time slot and all the bids must be submitted within
the time slot. During Time Slot 3, ask price and noncewill be
revealed by the seller.
C. SMART CONTRACT LOGIC
At the beginning of Time Slot 4, the smart contract will invoke
the private function verifyBidsAndAskPrice() by inputting
hash values of bids, ask price, and the corresponding nonce.
This function first verifies the signature as follows:
DecpkBuyer (data3) = data2||data1.
If it is correct then it proceeds to perform the same operation
to validate the seller’s ask prices transactions. If any party is
malicious and propagating false data then it can be identified
by the miner and the reputation of that party will be damaged.
Then to check whether bids and ask prices are correct by
checking the following equations for all buyers and sellers:
H (bids||nonce||data1) = data2,
H (ask price||nonce||data4) = data5.
If there is no cheating then the smart contract declares
the winners by executing Algorithm 1. Afterward, it will
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invoke function paymentToSeller() and function balanceTo-
Buyer() to settle payments.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present simulation results and demonstrate
the effect of rational agent in the centralized based auction
model.We also discuss the security properties of the proposed
blockchain based distributed auction framework.
FIGURE 4. The comparison of payments, offers (bids) and ask prices
under the proposed double auction mechanism, when n = 20, m = 15,
and fi = 3.
A. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section exhibits the performance of the proposed auction
mechanism in terms of individual rationality. In addition,
it shows the impact of a rational auctioneer in a centralized
mediated model. Note that, there are many malicious activi-
ties as discussed in Section III-E, which could directly affect
the network performance. However, in order to demonstrate
the effect of malicious insider, we only take into account an
example of malicious auctioneer (termed as selfish auction-
eer) in which it always ignores the lowest ask price for each
buyer. A Monte Carlo simulation platform representing the
system model was developed in MATLAB. For simulation
setting, unless otherwise stated we consider Cth = Ci ≥ 0.2,
that is, all the transmitters ti are desirous to achieve the same
minimum level of secure transmission. In addition, they are
randomly located according to a uniform distribution, such
that values of dti,qj are chosen within the range of (0, 1]. The
path loss exponent is set to a = ati,qj = 3, and κ = 0.1,
and the values of αti,qj and ηi,j are drawn randomly according
to a uniform distribution over the range (0, 30] and [20,
100], respectively. Moreover, all the intermediate relays are
located randomly over the uniform distribution such that their
channel qualities to destination di and ei are selected within
the range of (0, 1]. Fig. 4 shows the bids of winning buyers,
asks of winning sellers and payments made, when there are
n = 20 buyers and m = 15 sellers, each seller can only
support up to 3 buyers, i.e., fi = 3. Clearly, it is evident
that each winning seller is rewarded with a payment not less
than its ask, while each winning buyer is charged by the
payment not greater than its bid. This implies that the winning
transmitters ti and the relay operators qi that are successfully
FIGURE 5. The comparison of payments made by winning buyers under
both the honest and the selfish auctioneer, when the parameters are set
as m = 20, and f = fi = 4.
FIGURE 6. Minimum desired secrecy capacity versus the number of
winning buyers under both the honest and the selfish auctioneer, when
n = 20, m = 15, and f = fi = 3.
matched have gained positive utilities. Thus, the agents have
sufficient incentive to participate in the trade.
Fig. 5 demonstrates the impact of a selfish auctioneer on
the payments of winning buyers. It can be seen that due to the
selfish auctioneer some of the buyers are charged extra pay-
ments as compared to the payments made under the honest
auctioneer.Moreover, some of the legitimate destinations also
suffer by lost of data. For example, the buyers q1, q2 and q14
are not served due to the selfish auctioneer. This is because
of the reason that after removing the lowest ask prices, there
are no matching options left for the buyers demands, or,
the matched sellers have already allocated their resources
(i.e., subcarrier) to other buyers. This can also be exhibited
in Fig. 6, where the number of winning buyers also depends
on their level of security requirement. Thus, from both Fig. 5
and Fig. 6, it is apparent that the buyers and their correspond-
ing destinations are always substantially suffered because
of the selfish auctioneer. Figure. 7 shows the relationship
between the number of sellers and the network cost in terms of
total power consumption for security services. As expected,
the selfish auctioneer causes extra power dissipation. It can
be observed that for a small number of sellers there is a huge
gap between the two curves. This is due to the fact that for
fewer number of sellers there are lower number of options
for suitable seller-buyer matching, and as a result, selfish
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FIGURE 7. The amount of total power consumption in order to satisfy the
security requirements of all the buyers, when n = 20, and f = fi = 2.
auctioneer will remarkably affect the network performance.
However, the number of matching options increases with the
increase of the number of sellers, which effectively reduces
the impact of the selfish auctioneer and thus decreases the gap
between the curves.
B. SECURITY PROPERTIES OF THE
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The aim of the blockchain based framework is to remove
the central authority (i.e., auctioneer) in traditional systems
where the auctioneer in traditional system can manipulate
the bidding system to increase his own profit. However,
distributed system like the one proposed in this paper could
be vulnerable to attacks such as replay, manipulation and
repudiation. In this subsection, we describe how each of these
attacks are mitigated in our proposed framework.
1) REPLAY ATTACKS
Given that, in our proposed double auction framework, for
the transparency, the bids should be revealed to everyone in
the network. This will lead to replay attacks. For example,
in Time Slot 1, it is possible for an adversary to replay the
transactions (unsuccessful) announced in the past. This will
be a problem if there are no counter measures to mitigate
this e.g., the legitimate buyer will loss money for something
he didn’t ask. However, the proposed protocol mitigate this
issue by incorporating two parameters: time and transaction
id. Even though it is possible for the adversary to change
time and transaction id in data1 and data2, it is not possible
for generating legitimate signature data3. We used the same
technique to protect the sellers transaction.
2) MANIPULATION ATTACKS
Since our protocol follows sequential approach, it is possible
for the buyers to manipulate their bids once they knew the ask
price of sellers or the sellers can increase their ask price if they
knew the bids in advance.Wemitigated this problem by incor-
porating hashing operation in Time Slot 1 and Time Slot 2.
During these slots, buyer and seller commit their bid and ask
price via a simple hashing operation. In Time Slot 3, they
will reveal the values. Since hash functions, like SHA256,
are one-way function, it is infeasible for buyer or seller to find
another bid (smaller than committed) or ask price (bigger than
committed) so that they could generate the same hash values
in data2 or data5.
3) BRUTE FORCE ATTACK BY SELLER
The range of bids are limited e.g., 0 to 10000 (i.e., 14 bits).
Even though we use one way hashing function to hide the
buyers’ bid in data2 during Time Slot 1, if we don’t add
nonce, the seller can easily obtain bids by computing all
possible (i.e., there only 214 possibilities) values for bids.
In order to avoid this problem, we added 2048−bit long
nonce. This will increase the complexity from 214 into 22048
(computing all possibilities would require several hours).
4) REPUDIATION ATTACK
Similar to traditional bidding systems, buyers may deny their
commitments if the winning price is substantial or want to
change their mind. Since our model follows asymmetric key
based digital signature and invokes smart contract, buyers
cannot prove that he didn’t generated a particular winning bid.
Similarly, since our model uses smart contracts, the payment
will be taken from the buyer wallet automatically. However,
since the smart contract is a software program, buyers can
terminate their device before the transaction is signed by the
buyers’ private key. However, terminating the smart contract
will put the buyer on danger of bad reputation and the Ethers
stored in buyers wallet become unusable i.e., the miner will
blacklist all the Ethers under the particular buyers public key
and update the blockchain.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a double auction mechanism to
bridge network economics need and transmitters require-
ments of PLS using cooperative relaying and jamming.
Through theoretical analysis, we proved that the proposed
double auction is individual rational, budget balance and
truthful. Our analyses demonstrate that if the the proposed
model is employed by the traditional centralized auction
framework, a selfish auctioneer can ruin the network per-
formance in terms of data loss and extra power dissipation.
In addition, the winning buyers can be suffered by extra
payments. Thus, in order to address the malicious activities
of participants, we developed a decentralized, cheat-proof,
and autonomous auction framework, based on smart contract
features of blockchain. Moreover, a virtual currency system
was introduced for all the transactions, where a node that
contributes to a successful delivery can obtain a reward.
We analyzed that the proposed framework can also mitigate
many security attacks including replay attack, manipulation
attack, brute force attack, and repudiation attack.
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